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Abstract 
 
We examine the role of trademarks in firm longevity and IPO underpricing. We borrow 
arguments from asymmetric information theory and juxtapose alternative explanations to 
uncover which approach best describes the underpricing phenomenon with the aid of trademarks 
relationship to firm longevity. We further argue that TMs that are associated with physical 
products are more likely to reduce information asymmetries than TMs associated with services. 
Therefore, we posit that TM activity by firms in the service industries is more likely to increase 
underpricing while in the case of the manufacturing firm’s TM activity is less (or not) likely to 
result to increased underpricing. We collect 2,275 US IPOs from 1997-2016 and we find that on 
average the presence of trademarks in a firm’s portfolio increases underpricing. We link our 
results with the extant literature and provide evidence which supports that higher trademark 
activity is associated with firm longevity and signaling quality through IPO underpricing. 
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Google, in the filing for its initial public offering, worried that the term “Google” could one day 
become synonymous with "search"--resulting in both a loss of trademark protection and reduced 
brand value. Google's trademark--now the most valuable on the planet, according to Brand 
Finance--is worth an estimated $44 billion, or 27% of the firm's overall value, measured by 
market capitalization (its stock price multiplied by the number of shares).  
 [Forbes, June 15, 2011] 
 
1. Introduction 
Trademarks (TMs) constitute one of the most important activities that companies can incorporate 
in their business strategy to help consumers identify their innovative products or services. A 
successful such strategy can generate substantial benefits and increase the firm’s value. Further, 
companies may encompass TMs in their general business strategy to generate and display new 
brands, labels, names, signatures, shapes of goods and new packaging before the major decision 
to list in the stock exchange. Box Inc., a Red wood City, California, based company involved in 
cloud storage and file hosting for personal accounts and businesses was intensifying its effort in 
2014 to finalize its offering. Interestingly, the firm chose the previous two years to introduce 
fourteen trademarks from a total of twenty-three that had historically in order to promote its 
image in the market. Box Inc was listed on the 23rd of January 2015 and it was heavily 
underpriced by 65.93% leaving $115.37 million on the table.  
Innovation is one of the key drivers that motivates companies to list in order to advance 
their competitive advantage and therefore increase profitability (Griliches, 1992; Hall, 1996, 
Cao, Jiang and Ritter, 2015)1 while several studies have underlined the importance of TMs in 
firm’s innovative activity (Allegrezza and Guarda-Rauchs 1999; Schmoch 2003; Jensen and 
Webster 2009; Millot 2012). Further, since the seminal works of Schechter (1927) and more 
recently Healey et al. (2007), research has extensively investigated the importance of TMs in 
corporate events (e.g., Sadner and Block, 2011; Block et al., 2014; Block et al., 2015; Bernstein, 
2015).  
Trademarks can generate revenues in companies aiming to list by achieving recognition 
from public, by licensing the logos or brand name to third parties, by bringing new technologies 
onto the markets for products (i.e., product-based commercialization strategies), or by adopting a 
combination of the two strategies. Τhe literature has not yet examined the impact of trademarks 
                                                        
1 At the macro level, innovation plays a key role in economic growth and sustainability (Jones, 2005) 
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formation in capital raised process during the initial public offering. This raises several 
interesting questions. Do trademarks increase underpricing because of their intangibility? What if 
trademarks are related to firm longevity and signalling quality through underpricing?  
Motivated by the lack of relative empirical evidence on the subject, we address these 
questions on the role of trademarks in the IPOs process by examining the relationship between 
emblems and the returns that those public offerings secure to their investors as well as their 
survivability in the long term. We use a large and comprehensive sample of U.S. IPOs listed over 
the period from 1997 to 2016.  
We borrow arguments from the asymmetric information literature to predict and explain 
the role of TMs. On the one hand, TMs, as any intangible asset, may be harder to value ex ante 
than tangible assets. This can increase the information asymmetry among the participating 
players (mainly firms, investors and underwriters) which could result in higher underpricing. 
Further, issuers with TM activity, knowledgeable of their higher quality, may be willing to 
tolerate underpricing to a greater extent differentiating themselves from firms with no TMs to 
signal their potentially superior long-term post-IPO performance. These firms will exhibit longer 
life-span so there is higher probability to raise more funds in more privileged terms.  
On the other hand, TMs are associated with the firm’s brand, related products and 
services. Therefore, TMs could help to substantially alleviate uncertainty about company 
potential and dynamics. This latter argument could result in lower underpricing. Given that there 
are strong arguments both in favor and against underpricing we point to the need to answer this 
question empirically. 
We further argue that TMs that are associated with products are more likely to reduce 
information asymmetries than TMs associated with services. Therefore, we posit that TM 
activity by firms in the service industries is more likely to increase underpricing while in the case 
of the manufacturing firm’s TM activity is less (or not) likely to result to increased underpricing.  
Our results show that on average a firm with TM activity experiences a 4% increase in 
underpricing compared to a firm with no TM activity.  Interestingly, we also find strong 
evidence to support our prediction regarding the presence of TMs in the service and 
manufacturing industries respectively. Almost exclusively our baseline results are driven by 
firms in the service sector. This implies a sharp contrast between these two sectors. TMs in the 
manufacturing sector can be more readily valued as the outcome of innovative products; a fact 
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that can drive down any information asymmetries. On the contrary, while TMs in the service 
industry can still represent innovative output in the form of services, the market may be more 
perplexed as to the exact valuation of such intangible assets. To our knowledge, this is the first 
study that contrasts the value of TMs between service and manufacturing firms.  
We do claim that TM activity by firms, when controlling for all other factors, can have a 
significant contribution to IPO returns. To this end, one can argue that our results are potentially 
biased. Therefore, to control for potential bias in our results we sought for potential variables that 
can be used as instruments. Our only viable instrument is the industry’s Market to Book Ratio. 
While our results are qualitatively similar, such an instrument may not be the ideal candidate. 
Therefore, to further provide robustness we perform propensity score matching techniques where 
in essence identify firms without TMs that are similar to firms with TMs. Results from this 
analysis also corroborate the baseline results. 
 Additional results from the firm’s TM portfolio size complement our baseline results. In 
the case of the service industry’s firms the size of the TM portfolio does not matter; the mere 
presence of TMs is enough to increase underpricing for these firms. In the case of the 
manufacturing industry, firms with an average-sized portfolio appear to have higher underpricing 
compared to firms without TMs and firms with few or many TMs. We argue that for these firms, 
asymmetric information may be larger as they may not yet able to transcend their products’ 
quality in the same fashion as more TM-experienced firms.  
In an important departure from prior studies, we thoroughly examine TMs as the outcome 
of establishing identifiability for material goods, services as well as firms. From the firm’s 
viewpoint TMs show promise in analyzing (1) links between technological activity and 
marketing advantages; (2) international patterns of sectoral specialization, (3) rates and 
directions of product innovations in different industrial sectors, (4) evolution of economic 
organizations and structures, not only in terms of entry and exit of firms, but also in terms of firm 
growth, differentiation, and diversification. In this context, firms consider their IPO as part of 
their strategic portfolio linked to both their innovative and competitive stance and decision 
making. There are multiple reasons for such a strategy: attracting capital, customers, investors, 
executives and workers, input suppliers and finally establishing institutional credibility and 
political support. From the society’s viewpoint, TMs are also important for at least three reasons: 
(1) they confer an exclusive right of using a brand helping companies to appropriate the returns 
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of investing in new products or improve existing ones; (2) they are an important aspect of 
contemporary culture world-wide; and (3) they are a source of qualitative and quantitative 
information on socio-economic activity. 
This study makes important contributions to the IPOs and financial intermediation 
literature. First, it provides new evidence on the effect of trademarks, by shedding light on 
innovative activities of companies in the prior listing period and their determination of success 
after going public. Specifically, we find that firms that involve on trademark activity are more 
underpriced in comparison to their peers without trademarks. We show that the evidence of 
quality is undervalued during the formation of the finalized offer price providing support to Hall 
(1993) and Hall and Hall (1993) which suggest that investors might be myopic in pricing the 
future cash flows from innovations, leading to undervaluation. Huberman and Regev (2001) and 
Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2012) show that investors with limited attention may fail to reflect 
innovation information into stock prices, leading to undervaluation. Second, to our knowledge, 
this is the first study to explicitly account for the long-term performance of companies which 
involve on trademark creation prior listing. Third, our study offers new insights on the influence 
of TM introduction on the probability of failure and survivability of initial public offering (IPO) 
firms. Our findings also have important implications for issuers. For instance, we provide 
justification that companies should demonstrate creativity prior going public and ability to 
convert creativity through capital raised into successful projects. This is consistent with the 
notion that the success of the trademark in the market signals the quality of its services.  
Our study is related to the works of Heeley, Matusik and Jain (2007), Krasnikov, Mishra 
and Oroso (2009), Sadner and Block (2011), Useche (2014), Bernstein (2014), Vismara (2014), 
Block et al. (2015), Cao, Jiang and Ritter (2015), Gounopoulos and Pham (2018), Heeley, et al. 
(2007), Useche (2014), Vismara (2014) and Cao et al. (2015) who empirically examine the 
relationship between innovation, entrepreneurial firms and business outcomes. We update their 
work using a comprehensive sample of new listings and offer new evidence on the associated 
relationships between TM creation and activity the IPO initial aftermarket return and especially 
survivorship in the long term. Chemmanur et al. (2018) on a recent study investigates the role of 
trademarks in the financing, valuation, and performance of Venture Backed IPOs. We extend 
their work by exploring TMs in the entire sample of IPOs. In addition, we investigate the 
longevity of those firms and show that firms going public with TMs may be indicating their 
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innovative character using underpricing as a signal of their prospects. The economic intuition 
suggests that the quality signal transmitted via the underpricing of the IPO will be received as 
endorsement by financial intermediates and the market to mitigate adverse selection costs of 
funding in the post IPO period.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and our 
theoretical predictions. Section 3 outlines our econometric specification. We describe our data 
construction and sample in Section 4. We present our results and robustness tests in Section 5. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
2.1. Trademark Basics 
A trademark is a type of Intellectual Property (IP) that is employed by firms to 
differentiate their products and services, reduce search costs and establish consumer loyalty. It 
can, among others, take the form of word, phrase, symbol or combination thereof.2 A firm that 
wishes to obtain a TM in the US needs to file its application at the USPTO and therefore undergo 
an examination process.3 Investment in TMs is regularly treated as an operational expense under 
SG&A and under certain circumstances as intangible assets.4  
TMs are the most widely used type of IP protection as it is available both to small and 
large firms at a relatively low cost (Graham et al 2013; Hall et al 2014) while, according to the 
US National Science Foundation (2012), constitute one of the most important IP mechanisms for 
innovative and R&D intensive firms. Further, firms spend considerable effort and money 
developing their own TMs as part of their marketing strategy (von Graevenitz 2013) and their 
importance rests on the achieved degree of company identifiability and commercialization. 
Given the importance of TMs for firms, the related scholarly literature has increased 
substantially over the last twenty years. One of the first strands of this research was to examine 
the indication of their role and how closely linked to the introduction of new products. In other 
words, they are likely to be associated with entry or improved versions of established products. 
                                                        
2 For the full definition se See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
3 There are several conditions that a trademark needs to meet to be awarded. For instance, it must have an 
identifiable form that can be represented in a graphical way. Signs, words, icons and three-dimensional shapes are 
all acceptable forms of TMs (Mendonça  ̧et al. 2004). Second, upon registration the firm needs to provide proof of 
sales of products or services associated with the trademark. For more see Graham et al. (2013). 
4 Intangible assets also include patents, brand name, franchise and economic goodwill. 
7 
 
OECD classifies initial product development as an indication of innovation (Faurel et al. 2017).  
Mendonça et al. (2004) presents corroborative evidence. Amara et al. (2008) also provide 
support towards this argument; employing a sample of 2625 Canadian firms, they conclude that 
TMs are complementary to patents. Patents are the type of IP that has been most closely linked to 
innovation activity (see Pakes and Griliches 1980; Griliches 1981; Trajtenberg 1990). Therefore, 
this strong association between patents and TMs is the cornerstone of innovation activity. 
Finally, Flikkema et al. (2014) also provide support to the above discussion by showing that 60% 
of Benelux TMs are associated with more innovation. 
A major related strand of this literature has examined whether TMs contribute to the 
firm’s market value. For a sample of Australian firms, Bosworth and Rogers (2001) find an 
insignificant relationship between TMs and market value. While in a later study, for UK firms, 
Greenhalgh and Rogers (2007) conclude that TMs contribute to firm’s market value; the 
interpretation they offer correlates TMs with firm’s innovation. Sandner and Block (2011), 
Fosfuri and Giarratana (2009), Krasnikov et al. (2009), and Block et al. (2014b), Llerena and 
Millot (2013) Thoma (2015) in a similar spirit, examine samples of firms from different periods 
and countries and find  a positive effect of TMs on firm value. 
Several other studies have examined the contribution of TMs in various economic and 
business activities. Block et al. (2014) and Zhou et al. (2016) show that TMs are associated to 
new firms’ access to venture capital and to assessing venture capital valuation. Seethamraju 
(2003) find that for a sample of US firms, TMs are associated with increased sales while 
Griffiths et al. (2011) find  that TMs contribute to firm’s profits. 
While the above studies have expanded our understanding of the role of TMs to 
economic activity and value, until now there is no empirical study that examines the role of TMs 
to a firm’s IPO underpricing. In the following section, we discuss on the possible roles and 
interactions of TMs with underpricing and possible other firm dimensions. 
 
 2.2. Trademarks and IPO underpricing  
An IPO is a mechanism which ranks high in every company’ strategy as far as providing 
identifiability, serving to attract better executives and input providers, as well as more loyal 
customers. IPOs then can be reckoned, to perform a chorus role in further establishing the 
company image to the public conscience. TMs can help towards this direction as in collaboration 
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with an IPO can broaden the image of the company and solidify awareness about the firm, 
enhancing the creation of a brand name. However, the direct role of TMs in IPO underpricing is 
more nuanced. Asymmetric information theories can point towards several corollaries regarding 
IPO underpricing, relevant to the information emanating from the existence of TMs.  
One the one hand, firms for which “relevant” value information is more widely spread 
among investors should experience less underpricing (Rock, 1986; Michaely and Shaw, 1994; 
Luo, 2008).5 This effect is enhanced if TMs tend to reduce the asymmetry between issuers and 
investors as well as informed and uninformed investors. In this order, issuers with higher 
exposure to intangibility need the cash to mitigate financial risk. In a recursive argument, TMs 
tend to reduce information asymmetries and thus underpricing so that enough cash is generated 
to hedge their position in the Balance sheet structure. Moreover, firms with TMs may seek a 
more credible specification of their value by underwriters since the intangibility of their assets 
prescribes for a stronger need for cash as collateral and liquidity requirement.6 
On the other hand, the higher the uncertainty about the value of the firm the higher is the 
expected underpricing (Ritter, 1984; Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Beatty and Welch, 1996; 
Benveniste et al, 2003; Ljungvist and Wilhelm, 2003; Schenone, 2004; Healey et al, 2007).7 TMs 
as intangibles will tend to increase the ex-ante uncertainty about the true value of the firm.  
Chemmanur et al. (2018) argue that TMs play a role as asymmetric information dissipater in the 
setting of the offer price, which is an expectation from the underwriter’s point of view of the first 
day closing price. It reduces the discount imposed by underwriter as it predicts superior post IPO 
performance. 
Further, IPO underpricing theory is able to provide another argument in support of higher 
underpricing in the presence of TMs. Namely, underpricing as a means of signaling firm quality.  
When issuers have better information about their true value compared to investors, they have an 
incentive to accept higher underpricing in order to separate themselves from lower quality firms 
and succeed to raise funds in more privileged terms in later equity issues (SEOs). Firms with 
TMs have an insider’s view of the true value of these assets especially when TMs do not appear 
                                                        
5 For instance, Heeley et al. (2007) argue that patents is the key to reducing asymmetric information during an IPO. 
In our case TMs can also act in a similar fashion.  
6 Rajan and Servaes (1997) as well as Loughran and Ritter (2004) point out the role of analysts in the IPO 
underpricing puzzle. Overoptimism by analysts can feed on TMs and vice versa so underpricing is the mechanism to 
make TMs more effective.  
7 For instance, Chemmanur et al. (2010) emphasize the supportive role that institutional investors play in the 
aftermarket and that underpricing is the mechanism to enhance this role 
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on the balance sheet (Ibbotson, 1975; Grinblatt and Huang, 1989; Welch, 1989; Luo, 2008; 
Francis et al, 2010). Underwriters wish to keep all stakeholders satisfied, especially fund 
managers. They can count on the firm’s identifiability and a possible unsatisfied clientele for 
IPO shares, pushing first day closing price up. Finally, fund managers participating in the book 
building process, have an incentive to keep the offer price low for firms difficult to price such as 
firms with TMs (Welch, 1992; Choudhry and Nanda, 1996; Asquith et al., 1998; Krigman et al, 
1999; Ljungvist et al., 2004). 
From the above, one can argue that the intangibility aspect of TMs and the possibility that 
their value is not explicitly accounted for on the Balance Sheet, even at cost, creates a setting 
where contradicting theoretical arguments predict a different relationship between TMs and IPO 
underpricing. For the remainder of our paper we pursue empirically this question to infer which 
of the above arguments is more prevalent.   
Finally, we posit that the strength of each of the above arguments is likely to differ across 
industries. From a simple point of view, it can be reasonably assumed that some consumers are 
investors and all investors are consumers. Hence, a firm with TMs is a better recognizable entity 
compared to its counterparts lacking TMs, all else equal. However, this is more likely to occur 
when TMs are associated with tangible products compared to intangible – i.e. services. 
Therefore, we argue that TMs associated with firms in product-based industries can reduce the 
asymmetric information between owners and investors and therefore underpricing. On the 
contrary, TMs associated with services are not likely to reduce any ex ante information 
asymmetry and therefore increase IPO underpricing. 
 
2.3 Trademarks and firm longevity 
We examine the impact of trademark activity in firm’s longevity following the competing 
explanations of underpricing, emanating from the asymmetric information literature.  In this way 
we can put alternative propositions, within this strand of the literature, to test and fill an 
important gap in the relevant empirical research.8 
                                                        
8 There are many factors on which the survival probability depends. Following the literature, both size and age of the 
firm have a positive impact on firms’ survival in the market (Dunne and Hughes, 1994). Additionally, industry level 
characteristics such as market size, growth rate, ownership advantages and growth strategies constitute a cornerstone 
for firms’ longevity (Mata and Portugal, 1994; (Mata and Portugal, 2001). While we do control for such factors in 
our analysis, these are beyond the scope of our paper. 
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A large number of studies indicate that innovation plays important role in business 
survival, (Hall, 1987; Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Esteve-Pérez et al., 2004; Cefis and Marsili, 
2005; Geroski, 1995; Audretsch, 1995; Buddelmeyer et al., 2010; Tsvetkova et al., 2014; Ugur et 
al., 2016; Kim and Lee, 2016). Although these studies have found a clear positive effect between 
innovation and firms’ longevity there are also several studies that indicate insignificant or 
conflicting relationship. Li et al. (2010), using data on 870 software companies, relate R&D 
capital expenditures on labs and equipment with lower hazard rates. Mahmood (2000), using a 
US sample of startup companies, finds that R&D intensity have insignificant effects in 11 out of 
17 estimations based on a log logistic model. The above studies point to the growing need to 
filter innovation, not just by the evolution of the product itself but also by the development 
around it, which makes it more recognizable and valuable to the customers. This incremental 
type of innovation can be measured fairly well through the company’s TM activity. 
TM activity as it is related to firm value and longevity presents an extremely valuable 
opportunity to analyze underpricing in the context of the aforementioned asymmetric 
information and signaling theories. These theoretical arguments based mostly on the winners 
curse and information revelation theories could be juxtaposed to the signaling theories following 
the work of Allen and Foulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Huang (1989) and Welch (1989) who 
argue that issuers incur costs (underpricing) to reveal their quality and benefit from future SEOs 
when the quality would have been revealed. Firm longevity related to the investment in 
trademarks (additional cost to the firm) could provide a positive argument towards the 
superiority of the signaling approach vis-a-vis the contending theories. IPOs do reveal all those 
firms’ competitive advantage in the medium to long run. A period long enough, to compensate 
for the incurred costs, rendering underpricing the outcome of an optimizing behavior on the part 
of the issuer and the underwriter.  Indeed, the longer the anticipated life of an issuing firm the 
higher the optimal underpricing that can be accommodated. 
 
3. Econometric Setup 
To examine our empirical question, we first estimate the following equation: 
 
 (1) 
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Where Underpricing equals to the difference between the closing price and offer price 
divided by offer price.  
TMGranted is our variable of interest and takes the value of 1 if firm i has at least one 
trademark granted by the year before the IPO and 0 otherwise; for robustness, in alternative 
specification, we instead consider TMFiled which takes the value of 1 if firm i has filed for at 
least one trademark by the year before the IPO and 0 otherwise. 
If >0 then based on the arguments in the previous section, information asymmetry 
dominates any visibility caused by TMs. However, if <0, then TMs’ role as mechanism of 
identifiability dominates any asymmetric information effects that are caused by firm’s TM 
activity. 
The Controls include control variables traditional to the IPO underpricing literature. 
FirmAge, which is the number of years the firm is operating, has been employed in the literature 
as a proxy of risk; i.e. younger firms are more likely to be risky investments (Ritter, 1984, 1991; 
Carter et al., 1998).  
IPO Proceeds is the amount in millions of US dollars; a large value of Proceeds could 
imply greater visibility of the firm to investors and therefore result in lower underpricing.    
Earnings takes the value of 1 if the year prior to the IPO the firm discloses earnings and 0 
otherwise. The literature has not concluded to a clear sign of this variable to IPO underpricing as 
profitability in one year may not be a credible indicator to long-term post-IPO performance 
especially in light of exogenous shocks (Trueman et al. 2000).  
Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities over total assets before the IPO. Studies have 
shown that firms relying on debt to be less inclined to ‘allow’ a high underpricing (Jensen, 
1986). 
UnderwriterRank is collected by Loughran and Ritter (2004) and takes the value of 1 if 
the underwriter is prestigious and 0 otherwise. Carter and Manaster (1990) show that IPOs with 
prestigious underwriters are more likely to result to underpricing. This finding’s intuition is that 
established underwriters are less likely to be involved with IPOs of questionable quality.  
Overhang is calculated as the ratio of shares retained by pre-IPO shareholders to the 
equity given up in IPO.  A large value of Overhang could imply that underpricing bears no costs 
to the pre-IPO shareholders (Bradley and Jordan, 2002). 
We also include Revisions which is the change of the IPO offer price from the midpoint 
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of the initial filing price range. Any change is likely to indicate new information revealed to the 
underwriter by the time of listing (Hanley, 1993; Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001) 
We further include year dummies and various industry-related dummies. Specifically, 
Internet takes the value of 1 if the firm is classified as an internet firm and 0 otherwise.9 
Technology takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs to SIC codes that technology intensive 
industries (for the detailed classification see Table A1 of the Appendix). Nasdaq takes the value 
of 1 if the firm’s IPO was in NASDAQ and 0 otherwise. Further, we include dummies that take 
into account the first-digit of the SIC industry each firm belongs to.  
Our baseline estimation is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). While we do include a rich set 
of controls, there are may still be unobservables that are correlated with TM activity. To this end, 
an alternative econometric strategy would be to obtain an instrument that influences trademark 
activity but not directly influences the firm’s IPO underpricing. This task is daunting given that 
TM activity and the firm’s all other activities are closely intertwined. We follow Cao et al. 
(2015) and instrument with the industry’s average Market to book ratio.10 We should stress two 
important points. First, given that we need to have a considerable number of industry 
observations to construct this variable, we are forced to give up observations and subsequently 
end up with a smaller sample of firms for this part of the analysis. Second, and more importantly, 
this instrument is not likely to be ideal given the nature of the TM activity. 
Due to the latter point, we also perform propensity score matching in the spirit of 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) following the algorithms set by Becker and Ichino (2002). The 
propensity score method in essence matches the firms that have at least one TM prior to IPO (i.e. 
treated firms) with a firm, or firms, that do not have a TM (i.e. control firms) based on the rest of 
the control variables in the specification. To provide robustness that our results are not driven by 
different matching methods, we perform the three most common ones (Zhao 2004); that is, 
through means of the nearest neighbor, kernel and stratification. 
To examine whether TM activity contributes differently to each group of industry 
(product-based vs. service-based), we distinguish firms by their first digit SIC classification. We 
assign firms to the manufacturing/product sectors as those that belong in the Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing, Mining, Construction, and general Manufacturing and those to the service 
                                                        
9 As Internet firms are classified those with business description sections in Thomson Financial SDC containing any 
of the words “Internet”, “Online”, “eBusiness”, “eCommerce”, and “Website” 
10 In their study they use this variable to instrument for patent activity.  
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sectors that belong in the Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary service, 
Retail Trade, Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, general Services and Public Administration. 
We then re-estimate the regressions by distinguishing between the two groups and include 
interaction terms to examine any statistical significance between the two groups. 
 
4. Data 
4.1. Data construction 
We constructed our sample based on the population of US IPOs announced between 1997 
and 2016 from the Securities Data Company (SDC). We obtain accounting and aftermarket data 
from Compustat and the Center for Research in Security prices (CRSP). We also collected TM 
data from Orbis. Orbis collects and maintains TM data for the firms in its dataset. Recent studies 
have employed TM data from Orbis; for instance, Sandner and Block (2011) use the data to 
compile the TM stock for listed firms to examine their contribution to market value. We collect 
bibliographic information on TMs from the Office of the Chief Economist at the USPTO 
(Graham et al. 2013).11 To cross-verify the integrity of the Orbis database we also hand-collect 
the information on TMs from the firms’ prospectuses filed for their IPO.  
In line with the existing literature (Loughran and Ritter, 2002) we eliminate IPOs with 
offer price less than 4 dollars per share or Proceeds of less than 5 million USD. Further we 
disregarded IPOs that correspond to American depository receipt (ADR), leverage buyout (LBO) 
or real estate investment (REIT). We further exclude limited partnerships, unit offer, financial 
institutions, close-and funds and corporate spin-offs. We also exclude IPOs with underpricing 
larger than the 95th percentile. Our final sample includes 2,275 US listed firms. 
 
4.2 Data description 
 Table 1 displays the summary statistics of our dependent and independent variables. 
From the outset we see that most of firms had not filed for a TM until the IPO; only 24% of 
firms had filed for a TM prior to the IPO’s date. Given that this may seem counterintuitive, we 
further examined the firms’ prospectuses and found no reference to TM activity. Moreover, 
previous studies do find for a large share of listed firms to have no TM activity. For instance, in 
                                                        
11 The Office has recently made patent and trademark information publicly available in bulk. For more, see: 
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/economic-research/research-datasets  
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their sample, Sandner and Block (2014) find that approximately 40% of VC-funded firms had 
not filed for a TM.   
 Moving on to our dependent variable, the average firm experienced a 14.08% 
underpricing; more importantly firms with TMs have on average 6.8 percentage units more than 
firms without TMs. This first comparison yields the first insight that the presence of TMs is 
associated with higher underpricing compared to firms without. It provides support in favor of 
asymmetric information and any signal that the firm wishes to transcend to the market.  
 In Panel B we examine the independent variables used in the econometric estimations. 
Our focus is on the comparison between firms with and without TMs. Of the ten variables, three 
are statistically different at the 1% while two more at the 10% level. Intuitively, Revisions are 
higher for the firms with TMs as they are likely to be revised upwards more than for the firms 
without. Further, while the difference is borderline significant, firms with TMs are less likely to 
have a profitable year prior to IPO – a result that corroborates the risky aspect of TM-related 
activity as such firms pursue new product and higher investment on visibility.  
Firms with TMs are also more likely to have a prestigious underwriter and also more 
likely to be classified as technology firm and listed in NASDAQ. Since these differences are 
notable, we include them in the econometric specifications to flesh out the role of TMs in 
underpricing. More importantly however, from comparing the Proceeds and Leverage, the two 
groups appear to be of similar size and of similar leverage. Therefore, the likelihood of filing for 
TM is not likely to depend on size or the financial fundamentals of the firm. 
To alleviate any concerns about multicollinearity, we display the pairwise correlations of 
all the variables used in the baseline specification in Table 2. As it is evident no independent 
variable has a considerable positive or negative correlation with any other variable. Thus, from 
this analysis there is no cause for concern. 
Table 3 presents the overall IPO distribution by issue year and industry for survived and failed 
firms. Panel A presents a sample overview. It also reports subsamples with the listed and delisted 
IPOs. A company is considered survived as long as it is continually traded for a 5-year period 
following the IPO and accordingly failed when it becomes delisted due to any reason in this 
given period. Our initial sample consists of 2275 firms. From these, at the final date of our 
sample (December 31, 2016) 939 remain listed and 1336 have been delisted. For the 5-year 
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period after the IPO to be satisfied for our survival consideration we stop including IPOs as of 
December 31, 2011 so that this subsample consists from 1676 firms. Approximately 57,9% of 
these firms have survived and 42.1 % have failed. Panel B reports the sample distribution of 
surviving and failed firms over the period 1997-2011 by issue year. Τhe percentage of surviving 
companies is growing over the years. For instance, the survival rate of firms that go public with 
issue year 1997 is on average 54,1%. In contrast the percentage of surviving companies with IPO 
year 2011 appears to have increased to 70,1%. Additionally, the IPO activity has diminished 
over the crisis period 2008-2009.Panel C provides summary statistics by industry. From the 2275 
firms, 1414 operate in the service sector and 861 in manufacturing. Notably, at the end of 2016 
on average 28,2% of the companies that belong to the service sector where been delisted. 
Respectively, in the manufacturing sector the percentage is limited to 17.2%. In addition, from 
the 57.9% of the firms that have survived, 36 % are operating in the service sector and 21.9% in 
Manufacturing. 
Table 4 presents the distribution of survived firms with TMGranted and those without TMs for 
our sample constructed for the period 1997-2011. It also provides the cumulative percentage of 
failed firms by issue year and by sector. For instance, we show in panel A that for non-TM firms 
the cumulative percentage of failure is 8.9% during the first year, 25.7% for the year following 
IPO, 43.1% and 55.6% for the third- and fourth-year end 61% for the fifth year. On the contrary 
for TMGranted firms the cumulative percentages of failure are much smaller correspondingly, 
3%, 3%, 6%,13,3% and 16,6%. Notably, firms with trademark activity have by far lower failure 
rates. Panel B reports information for the sample of 1676 companies for the five-year period 
from the day of the IPO. The cumulative rates of failure for firms with TMGranted in the service 
sector are 2%, 0,6%, 1,4%, 2,2% and 2,5 compared to 5,1%, 12,7%, 18,3%, 22,8%, and 25,7% 
for non-TM firms. Similarly, in the manufacturing sector non-TM firms have higher failure rates 
equal with 2,1%, 4,8%, 7,6%, 9,7%, 11,6% compared to companies with TMGranted who have 
2%, 0,6%, 1,1%, 1,6%, 2,3% for the same time period of five years following the IPO. On 
average, in the service sector the distance in the failure rate between non-TM and TMGranted 
firms is higher compare to the manufacturing sector. Overall our results suggest that IPO firms 
with granted trademarks before the issue date exhibit better survivability compared to the 
companies with non-trademark activity. 
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In order to shed more light to the post IPO performance for TM active firms compared to the 
non-active ones we provide in Table 5 evidence that firms with trademarks issue new shares in 
SEOs with better terms, i.e. lower underpricing (see last column of the table). 
Table 5 demonstrates univariate analyses of SEO for both groups of firms those with TMGranted 
and those with no TMs. From our initial sample, 998 firms use SEOs to raise new equity. TM 
active firms exhibit on average lower volume of primary and total proceeds per firm which 
possibly indicates that TM active firms have better profitability and hence use less equity 
financing. 
5. Results 
5.1 Trademarks and IPO Underpricing 
Table 6 displays results for Equation 1. Column 1 estimates Equation 1 via OLS. First of 
all, all the control variables have the expected signs from previous studies even though they are 
not always significant. From here, we turn our attention to the role of TM activity. 
The coefficient of TMGranted shows that firms with TMs granted prior to their IPO have 
on average 4.1% more underpricing than firms without. Column 2 instruments TMGranted with 
the industry’s average market to book ratio. Given that due to data unavailability we are unable 
to construct this instrument for the entire sample these results should be interpret cautiously.  The 
coefficient is even larger than in Column 1.  In Columns 3 and 4 we estimate similar regressions 
to Columns 1 and 2 where instead of TMGranted we consider TMFiled as the treatment dummy. 
The coefficients here are a little smaller in magnitude while they are still significant. This could 
indicate that in the case where firms have just begun their TM activity prior to their IPO, the 
market may not readily evaluate the importance of TM activity for the particular firm.  
 To further alleviate endogeneity concerns, in Table 7 we consider propensity score 
matching techniques. Columns 1-3 display the results where we consider TMGranted as the 
treatment dummy; each column considers a different matching method; i.e. means of the nearest 
neighbor, kernel and stratification respectively (Zhao 2004). The coefficient of TMGranted 
ranges from 0.04 to 0.049 and is always significant at the 1% level. These results support the 
outcome from the OLS analysis in the previous Table and indicate that the role of TMGranted is 
not likely to be attributed to confounding factors. 
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Columns 4-6 display the results where we consider TMFiled as the treatment dummy in a similar 
format as the previous three columns. The coefficient of TMFiled ranges from 0.021 to 0.039; 
further, in the case of the nearest neighbor, the coefficient is not statistically significant at the 
10%. These results corroborate those of the previous table where they show that TMGranted is a 
stronger predictor of increased underpricing than TMFiled. Nonetheless, if we take cumulatively 
all the results into consideration, they show that TM activity in general is associated with 
increased underpricing. 
To examine our second conjecture on whether firms with TMs in the service sector have 
different underpricing compared to firms in the manufacturing sector, we re-estimate Equation 1 
in Table 8 while distinguishing between service and manufacturing firms. In Column 1 we 
consider firms in the service sectors while in Column 2 firms in the manufacturing sectors. 
TMGranted is associated with a 7.3% increase in underpricing in the case of the service sector 
while, in the case of the manufacturing sector, TMGranted coefficient is much smaller and 
statistically insignificant.  
To examine whether the coefficient of TMGranted is statistically significant between the 
two sectors, we take into account the entire sample and include in Equation 1 a Service dummy 
which takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs in the service sector and 0 otherwise and the 
interaction Service_x_TMGranted. The interaction term shows that TMGranted increases the 
underpricing by 5.7% more in the service sector than in the manufacturing sector. This 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level.12  
To provide further robustness that the above results hold for both the service and 
manufacturing sectors, we again perform propensity score matching for the TMGranted variable 
for both samples. Table 9 – Columns 1-3 display the results for the service sectors and Columns 
4-6 the results for the manufacturing sector. The results corroborate the findings from the 
previous Table.13 
                                                        
12 One can argue that firms that belong in the “Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary services” 
SIC industry classification could be distinctively different from all other firms in the service sectors, due to the size 
of potential physical assets. For this reason, in Table A.2. we re-estimate Table 5 by excluding these firms from the 
analysis. Results remain similar. 
13 To provide further robustness, Table A.3. performs propensity score matching where we expand the firms that can 
potentially be matched with the firms that have TMs in each sector. That is for the firms that have TMs in the 
service sector, we allow them to be matched with firms that do not have TMs granted by both the service and 
manufacturing sectors; analogously, for the firms that have TMs granted in the manufacturing sector. Results are 
qualitatively similar. 
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In Table 10 we examine whether the volume of TMs contribute differently to 
underpricing. In this case we replace in Equation 1 the treatment variable TMGranted with 
TMsBetwen1and2, TMsBetwen3and8 and TMsMoreThan8.14  Column 1 considers all firms in the 
service sector. The coefficient of TMsBetwen1And2 shows that firms with one or two TMs 
before IPO have 7% more underpricing than firms without any TMs. The coefficients of 
TMsBetwen3and8 (or TMsMoreThan8 show a similar difference between firms with the level of 
TMs and firms without. This analysis shows that for the service sector, there are no obvious non-
linearities in the size of the TM portfolio and underpricing. This is further corroborated by 
Column 2 where we consider only the firms in the service industry that have TMs prior to IPO; 
by default, we exclude TMsBetwen1And2 to avoid the dummy variable trap. In this case neither 
TMsBetwen3And8 nor TMsAbove8 are statistically different than zero supporting the previous 
results. In Column 3 we include all manufacturing firms, TMsBetwen1And2 and 
TMsMoreThan8show are not different from zero. However, firms with average sized TM 
portfolio (more than two and less than nine) have one average 4.2% more underpricing than 
firms with no TMs. This indicates that these firms experience higher underpricing than firms 
without any TMs or firms with a different size of TM portfolio (Column 4 corroborates the latter 
result). Therefore, for this subset of manufacturing firms, TMs play a positive role in 
underpricing as in the case of the service firms. This could indicate that for these firms, 
asymmetric information is larger than for manufacturing firms that either have little to no TM 
activity or firms that have a sizeable TM portfolio. 
Our overall results point to the positive role of TM activity in underpricing. This role 
however is by and large attributed to firms in the service sector with a notable exception for 
manufacturing firms with average sized TM portfolios. 
 
5.2. Trademark activity, firm longevity and signaling quality 
Thus far our baseline results point to the signaling hypothesis of trademark activity. 
Support for this hypothesis should imply that such firms with TM activity are more likely to 
perform better in the post-IPO period. This task is taken up in the final section of the results of 
                                                        
14 TMsBetwen1and2 takes the value of 1 if the firm has been issued between one and two trademarks before IPO and 
0 otherwise. TMsBetwen3and8 takes the value of 1 if the firm has been issued between three and eight TMs before 
IPO and 0 otherwise. TMsMoreThan8 takes the value of 1 if the firms has been issued more than 8 TMs before IPO 
and 0 otherwise. 
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this paper. We do collect data on the survivability of our firms in the sample. In particular we 
collect in years, the time that each firm remains public.15 We then examine the hazard rate of 
exiting the stock market following the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox 1972): 
 
 
 
where hExit is the probability that the firm i exits the stock market (gets delisted) at period 
t (counted in years, from the firm’s IPO month), given that it has not been previously delisted. 
The rest of the variables are defined similarly to Section 3. Our interest here is on . A negative 
sign of would show that firms with TM activity prior to IPO, have a lower hazard of being 
delisted. This would provide support for our aforementioned results.  
Starting with the graphical analysis, Figure 1 compares Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard 
estimates for firms with TM and w/o TM activity. Firms with TMs have a smaller hazard of 
exiting throughout the entire time span. Figure 2 compares the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates 
for both groups and shows similar results. Firms with TM activity are more likely to survive 
throughout the entire period. For instance, in the 15th year after the IPO, firms with TM activity 
are roughly 20% more likely to have survived than firms without TM activity.  
Our econometric analysis is presented in Table 11. Column 1 considers all firms. Firms 
with TM activity prior to IPO have a 1-exp(-0.692)=50% less hazard to get delisted from the US 
stock market than firms w/o TMs. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
result is in line with the outcome from table 5 and provides prima facie support for the signaling 
quality theory of IPO underpricing, since firms which will stay longer in the secondary market 
will have more opportunities to raise capital by issuing new shares in better terms. The context of 
issuance in SEO underpricing terms should compensate firms for too much underpricing at the 
IPO. 
We also distinguish between firms in the service and manufacturing industries. Both 
types of firms with TM activity have a similar difference with their non-TM counterparts. This 
shows that presence of TMs is related to a reduction in the hazard of being delisted. To account 
for any censoring issues, in Columns 4-6, we exclude firms with IPO year on or after 2012. The 
                                                        
15 Of these, 374 have TM activity prior to IPO. 
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difference in the hazard rates is now even bigger in favor of firms with TMs while remaining 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 TMs are an important business tool that firms employ to protect their innovative products 
and services and increase their visibility in the market. Unsurprisingly, numerous studies have 
examined their role in a variety of corporate events and finance metrics. However, to this date we 
do know little about their role in IPOs and in particular in IPO underpricing. A notable exception 
is the recently published working paper by Chemmanur et al. (2018) where they examine the role 
of TMs in the probability of exiting via an IPO and post-IPO market valuation. In our study we 
dwell deeper into the role of TMs as an information mechanism and explicitly examine the 
relationship between TMs and IPO underpricing.  
 Given the intricacies of both TMs, as intangible assets and what they represent in terms 
of innovation and differentiation, and IPOs, as a funding mechanism and market signal, we 
borrow arguments from information theory to predict the sign of the relationship. We posit that 
there are strong arguments both in favor and against increased underpricing. Empirically, we find 
asymmetric information to dominate any visibility attributed to TMs; as a result, for the average 
firm the presence of TMs increases underpricing. We further argue that firms with TMs are 
likely to signal their higher value by tolerating higher underpricing. We find support for this 
argument as such firms have a lower hazard of being delisted and raise capital with better terms  
in later financing. 
Our results are also heterogeneous by type industry. Investors and consumers may not be 
able to readily associate TMs with innovative services as opposed to physical products. 
Consistent with our theoretical arguments, we find that indeed it is the service sector that 
primarily drives this positive relationship TMs and IPO underpricing. A notable exception that 
also contributes to this relationship is firms in the manufacturing sector with average sized TM 
portfolios.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics by trademark activity. 
 Full Sample (N= 2275) IPOs with TMs (N = 533) IPOs without TMs (N=1742) P-value 
of  T -
Diff  Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max Mean Median Min Max 
 s.d.    s.d.    s.d.     
Panel A – IPO underpricing              
              
ln(Underpricing+1) 14.08 6.95 -97 114.2 19.3 14.71 -91 109.4 12.49 5.14 -97 114.2 00.0 
 23.49    25.1    22.75     
Panel B– IPO characteristics                                       
Proceeds                                           184.16 80.00 5.10 21767.22 212.11 78.00 6.00 16006,88 175.60 81.225 5.10 21767,22 0.29 
 708.44    1009,55    586.34     
Revisions -1.07 0.00 -83.33 56.25 -0.18 0.00 -69.23 56.25 -1.34 0.00 -83.33 40 0.08 
 13.45    14.08    13.24     
Earnings                                         0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 1 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.09 
 0.50    0.49    0.50     
Leverage 0.63 0.36 0.00 81.50 0.66 0.33 0.00 26.22 0.63 0.38 0.00 81.50 0.77 
 2.21    1.50    2.37     
FirmAge                                                    17.31 9.00 0.00 224.00 17.05 10.00 0.00 158.00 17.40 8.00 0.00 224.00 0.77 
 24.34    21.03    25.27     
UnderwriterRank                                     0.52 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
 0.49    0.48    0.50     
Internet 0.84 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.86 
 0.27    0.27    0.27     
Technology 0.31 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
 0.46    0.49    0.44     
Nasdaq 0.66 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
 0.47    0.43    0.48     
Overhang                                             4.30 2.82 0.00 88.63 4.55 3.27 0.00 88.63 4.22 2.68 0.00 76.37 0.31 
 6.66    6.36    6.75     
              
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for a sample of 2,275 U.S. IPOs announced from 1 January, 1997 to 30 Nov, 2016 along with the sub-samples of 
IPOs with and without TMs activity. All IPOs come from the Securities Data Company (SDC) database. The statistics provided include the mean, median, 
minimum, maximum and standard deviation for the dependent variables and all control variables used in the subsequent regressions. The presentation of each 
variable concludes with a test for difference in the sub-sample means. Panel A describes our main measures of IPO pricing, i.e. underpricing and revisions. Panel 
B describes the IPO firm characteristics which we control for in our analysis. Share price data is from CRSP; accounting data is from Compustat. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 2. Pairwise Correlations. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Underpricing 1.00            
TMGranted 0.12 1.00           
FirmAge                                                       -0.07 -0.01 1.00          
Proceeds                                           -0.01 0.02 0.13 1.00         
Earnings                                         -0.04 -0.04 0.10 0.04 1.00        
UnderwriterRank                                     0.07 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.02 1.00       
Revisions 0.42 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.04 0.10 1.00      
Overhang                                             0.11 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.10 0.09 1.00     
Leverage -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 1.00    
Nasdaq 0.10 0.11 -0.22 -0.16 -0.15 -0.33 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.00   
Technology 0.19 0.18 -0.17 -0.02 -0.10 0.03 0.13 0.11 -0.04 0.19 1.00  
Internet 0.15 0.00 -0.14 0.05 -0.07 0.00 0.12 0.08 -0.01 0.12 0.23 1 
Notes: This table reports pairwise correlations of variables used in the study. The sample includes 2,275 U.S. IPOs announced between 1997 and 2016. IPO deals 
are retrieved from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Database with aftermarket and accounting data obtained from CRSP and Compustat databases, 
respectively. TM data comes from the Orbis database and from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. 
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Table 3. IPO distribution by issue year and industry.  
Panel A: Distribution of IPOs, 1997-2016 
 From the IPO date to November 2016 From the IPO date to five years after the offering 
 N % N % 
Failed  1,336 58,7 706 42.1 
Survived 939 41.3 970 57.9 
Total  2275 100.00 1,676 100.00 
 
Panel C: Distribution by industry 
Industry        From the IPO date to November (1997-2016) From the IPO date to five years after the offering (1997-2011) 
 All IPOs Failed Survived All IPOs Failed Survived 
 N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Service 
 
1,414 62,1 773 34.00 641 28.2 1,076 64.2 473 28.2 603 36.00 
Manufacturing 861 37,9 470 20.6 391 17.2 600 35.8 233 13.9 367 21.9 
Total 2275 100.00 1243 54.6 1032 45.4 1,676 100 706 42.1 970 57.9 
Notes: The table presents the distribution of the overall sample by year and by sector for two groups of IPO firms: survived and 
failed firms. Survived firms are those that are still trading (delisting code of 100). Failed firms are those that are delisted due to 
acquisitions (delisting code from 200 to 299) and for negative reasons (delisting code greater than or equal 300). N denotes the 
number of observations. Delisting is tracked for five years after the IPO. 
Panel B: Distribution by issue year  
Year        All IPOs                        Failed                     Survived 
N N % N % 
1997 198 91 45.9 107 54.1 
1998 141 69 48.9 72 51.1 
1999 202 108 53.5 94 46.5 
2000 168 81 48.2 87 51.8 
2001 44 14 31.8 30 68.2 
2002 45 17 37.8 28 62.2 
2003 51 22 43.1 29 56.9 
2004 150 53 35.3 97 64.7 
2005 120 40 33.3 80 66.7 
2006 148 52 35.1 96 64.9 
2007 146 57 39 89 61 
2008 19 6 31.6 13 68.4 
2009 40 16 40 24 60.00 
2010 111 32 28.9 79 71.1 
2011 87 26 29.9 61 70.1 
2012 98 - - - - 
2013 168 - - - - 
2014 216 - - - - 
2015 108 - - - - 
2016 15 - - - - 
Total 2275 - - - - 
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Table 4. Survival distribution of IPO firms which have at least one granted trademark and those with no granted trademark. 
Panel A: Survival distribution by issue year (1997-2011) 
Year TM Granted  
Number and 
percentage of IPO 
firms 
Cumulative number and percentage of failed firms 
Within 1 year Within 2 years Within 3 years Within 4 years Within 5 years 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
1997 Yes  30 48.60 1 3 1 3 2 6 4 13.3 5 16.6 
 No  167 51.40 15 8.9 43 25.7 72 43.1 93 55.6 102 61 
1998 Yes  20 48.60 0 0.00 2 10 2 10 3 15 3 15 
 No  125 51.40 17 13.6 36 28.8 54 43.2 59 47.2 68 54.4 
1999 Yes  40 48.60 3 7.5 7 17.5 8 20 9 22.5 9 22.5 
 No  161 51.40 29 18 63 39.1 81 50.3 89 55.2 98 60.8 
2000 
 
Yes  37 36.80 0 0.00 3 8.1 6 16.2 9 24.3 11 29.7 
 No  130 63.20 21 16.1 43 33 57 43.8 62 47.6 69 53 
2001 Yes  11 26.67 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
 No  34 73.33 2 5.8 6 17.6 7 20.5 15 44.1 15 44.1 
2002 Yes  10 23.33 0 0.00 1 1 2 20 2 20 3 30 
 No  35 76.67 4 11.4 6 17.1 10 28.5 12 34.2 14 40 
2003 Yes  15 56.41 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 16.6 3 20 5 33.3 
 No  36 43.59 3 8.3 8 22.2 8 22.2 12 33.3 17 47.2 
2004 Yes  47 61.05 1 2.1 2 4.2 5 10.6 8 17 9 19.1 
 No  104 38.95 3 2.8 9 8.6 26 25 40 38.4 45 43.2 
2005 Yes  28 52.11 1 3.5 1 3.5 3 10.7 5 17.8 8 28.5 
 No  93 47.89 5 5.3 14 15 22 23.6 27 29 33 35.4 
2006 Yes  27 63.86 0 0 3 11.1 3 11.1 6 22.2 7 25.9 
 No  122 36.14 5 4 18 14.7 28 22.9 40 32.7 46 37.7 
2007 Yes  32 57.14 0 0.00 1 3.1 4 12.5 6 18.7 10 31.2 
 No  113 42.86 8 7 18 15.9 28 24.7 39 34.5 47 41.5 
2008 Yes  5 57.14 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 20 
 No  14 42.86 1 7.1 4 28.5 4 28.5 4 28.5 5 35.7 
2009 Yes  8 43.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 12.5 1 12.5 
 No  32 56.67 1 3.1 5 15.6 9 28.1 12 37.5 15 46.8 
2010 Yes  29 43.33 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 3.4 2 6.8 3 10.3 
 No  84 56.67 7 8.3 11 13 14 16.6 25 29.7 31 36.9 
2011 Yes  25 43.33 0 0.00 1 4 3 12 4 16 5 20 
 No  62 56.67 1 1.6 9 14.5 13 20.9 16 25.8 21 33.8 
1997-2011 Yes  364 21.7 6 1.6 20 5.4 41 11.2 62 17 80 21.9 
 No 1312 78.3 122 9.2 293 22.3 433 33 545 41.5 626 47.7 
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Panel B: Survival distribution by industry (1997-2011) 
Industry  
(two-digit SIC code) 
TM 
Granted  
Number and 
percentage of IPO 
firms 
Cumulative number and percentage of failed firms 
Within 1 year Within 2 years Within 3 years Within 4 years Within 5 years 
  N % N % N % N % N % N % 
Service 
 
Yes 192 11.4 3 2 10 0.6 23 1.4 36 2.2 42 2.5 
Service 
 
No 884 52.8 86 5.1 213 12.7 306 18.3 
382 22.8 431 25.7 
Manufacturing Yes 172 10.3 3 2 10 0.6 18 1.1 
26 1.6 38 2.3 
Manufacturing No 428 25.5 36 2.1 80 4.8 127 7.6 
163 9.7 195 11.6 
Total firms with trademarks Yes 364 23.4 6 4 20 0.12 41 2.5 62 3.8 80 4.8 
Total firms without 
trademarks No 1,312 76.6 122 7.2 293 17.5 433 25.9 
545 35.2 626 37.3 
Total firms 
  1676 100 128 11.2 313 17.17 474 28.4 
607 36.3 706 42.1 
Notes: The table presents the comparison of the distribution and cumulative failure rates by issue year and industry between the two groups of IPO firms: those 
with a TMGranted and those who don’t. The cumulative number and percentage of failed firms are examined for five years after the offering. N denotes the 
number of observations. 
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Table 5. The Role on TMs on SEO proceeds and underpricing. 
TM Granted Number of 
firms 
Number of SEO SEO/firm  SEO primary 
proceeds per 
firm 
SEO total 
proceeds 
SEO 
underpricing 
Yes 293 645 2.20 1.06 1.44 0.04 
No 705 1,728 2.45 1.33 1.55 0.23 
Total 998 2373 2.37 - - - 
Notes: The table presents the distribution of univariate analyses of SEO for both groups of firms those with 
TMGranted and those with no TMs. 
 
Table 6. Role of TM activity in IPO underpricing. 
 Dependent Variable:  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TMGranted 0.041*** 0.310***   
 (0.011) (0.0575)   
TMFiled   0.035*** 0.320*** 
   (0.012) (0.0605) 
FirmAge -0.000 -0.000241 -0.000 -0.000185 
 (0.000) (0.000159) (0.000) (0.000156) 
Proceeds -0.000 -1.34e-05*** -0.000 -1.32e-05*** 
 (0.000) (4.34e-06) (0.000) (4.24e-06) 
Internet 0.030 0.0207 0.030 0.0182 
 (0.021) (0.0262) (0.021) (0.0262) 
Earnings 0.003 -0.00274 0.004 -0.00170 
 (0.010) (0.00945) (0.010) (0.00944) 
Nasdaq 0.013 0.0190* 0.013 0.0195* 
 (0.009) (0.0115) (0.009) (0.0113) 
Technology -0.003 0.0109 -0.003 0.0103 
 (0.017) (0.0149) (0.017) (0.0147) 
UnderwriterRank 0.021** 0.0225** 0.021** 0.0207** 
 (0.010) (0.0103) (0.010) (0.0104) 
Revisions 0.005*** 0.00558*** 0.005*** 0.00565*** 
 (0.000) (0.000343) (0.000) (0.000339) 
Overhang 0.001* 0.00131* 0.001* 0.00112 
 (0.001) (0.000722) (0.001) (0.000708) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.00180 -0.001 -0.00170 
 (0.001) (0.00205) (0.001) (0.00214) 
     
Observations 2,275 1,425 2,275 1,425 
R-squared 0.162  0.161  
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
SIC FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 include TMGranted as focal independent variable. Column1 is estimated via OLS. Column 
2 instruments TMGranted with the industry’s average Market-to-Book Ratio. In Columns 3 and 4, for robustness, 
instead of considering TMGranted we consider the dummy TMFiled. As with the two previous columns, Column 3 
is estimated via OLS Column 4 instruments TMFiled with the industry’s average Market-to-Book Ratio. In all 
columns, standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. An asterisk indicates 
significance at the 10% level; two indicate significance at the 5% level; three indicate significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 7. Role of TM activity in IPO underpricing. Propensity Score Matching. 
 Dependent Variable:  
 Treatment Variable: TMGranted Treatment Variable: TMFiled 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Nearest neighbor 0.049**   0.021   
 (0.024)   (0.018)   
Kernel  0.045***   0.039***  
  (0.013)   (0.013)  
Stratification   0.040***   0.033*** 
   (0.013)   (0.013) 
       
Observations 2,275 2,275 2,275 2,275 2,275 2,275 
Notes: Propensity score techniques. In Columns 1-3 we select the TMGranted dummy based on the control variables 
of Table 2; that is, FirmAge, Proceeds, Internet, Earnings, Nasdaq, Technology, UnderwriterRank, Revisions, 
Overhang and Leverage. In Columns 4-6, for robustness, we select TMFiled based on the aforementioned variables. 
Columns 1 and 4 employ the nearest neighbor method, Columns 2 and 5 the kernel and Columns 3 and 6 the 
stratification method (Zhao 2004). An asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level; two indicate significance at 
the 5% level; three indicate significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
Table 8. Role of TM activity in IPO Underpricing by industry. 
 Dependent Variable:  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
TMGranted 0.073*** 0.013 0.015 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
Service   -0.011 
   (0.010) 
TMGranted_x_Service   0.057*** 
   (0.020) 
FirmAge 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Proceeds -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet 0.038* 0.062** 0.035* 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.020) 
Earnings 0.010 -0.011 0.002 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) 
Nasdaq 0.014 0.021 0.017* 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) 
Technology -0.004 0.026 0.007 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) 
UnderwriterRank 0.025* 0.017 0.020** 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) 
Revisions 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Overhang 0.002 0.001 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Observations 1,414 861 2,275 
R-squared 0.158 0.178 0.159 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Notes: All Columns are estimated via OLS. Columns 1 considers only firms in the services sectors; Column 2 
considers only firms in manufacturing sectors. Column 3 considers the entire sample and includes an interaction of 
TMGranted*Service=TMGranted_x_Service. Service takes the value of 1 if the firm belongs in the service sector 
and 0 otherwise. In all columns, standard errors reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. An 
asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level; two indicate significance at the 5% level; three indicate significance 
at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
Table 9.  Role of TM activity in IPO underpricing. Propensity Score Matching. 
 Dependent Variable:  
Treatment Variable: TMGranted 
 Only Firms in the Service Sectors Only Firms in the Manufacturing Sectors 
METHOD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Nearest neighbor 0.090**   -0.014   
 (0.036)   (0.024)   
Kernel  0.075***   0.012  
  (0.017)   (0.016)  
Stratification   0.074***   0.013 
   (0.019)   (0.015) 
       
Observations 1,414 1,414 1,414 861 861 861 
Notes: Propensity score techniques. In all Columns we select the TMGranted dummy based on the control variables 
of Table 2; that is, FirmAge, Proceeds, Internet, Earnings, Nasdaq, Technology, UnderwriterRank, Revisions, 
Overhang and Leverage. In Columns 1-3, we only consider firms in the service sectors; in Columns 4-6 we only 
consider firms in the manufacturing sectors. In Columns 1 and 4 we employ the nearest neighbor method, Columns 
2 and 5 the kernel and Columns 3 and 6 the stratification method (Zhao 2004). An asterisk indicates significance at 
the 10% level; two indicate significance at the 5% level; three indicate significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 10.  Role of TM volume in IPO Underpricing by industry. 
 Dependent Variable:  
 Only Firms in the Service Sectors Only Firms in the Manufacturing 
 All Firms Firms with TMs prior to IPO All Firms Firms with TMs prior to IPO 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
TMsBetwen1and2 0.071***  -0.002  
 (0.025)  (0.015)  
TMsBetwen3and8 0.075*** 0.003 0.042** 0.051** 
 (0.022) (0.030) (0.017) (0.023) 
TMsMoreThan8 0.073*** -0.014 -0.005 0.001 
 (0.022) (0.033) (0.053) (0.058) 
FirmAge 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Proceeds -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet 0.038* 0.098** 0.065** - 
 (0.022) (0.046) (0.031) (-) 
Earnings 0.010 0.002 -0.012 -0.023 
 (0.013) (0.024) (0.013) (0.029) 
Nasdaq 0.014 -0.043 0.020 -0.015 
 (0.011) (0.027) (0.013) (0.029) 
Technology -0.004 0.018 0.024 -0.003 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.017) (0.028) 
UnderwriterRank 0.025* 0.013 0.016 0.016 
 (0.015) (0.028) (0.013) (0.024) 
Revisions 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Overhang 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.010 0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) 
     
Observations 1,414 273 861 260 
R-squared 0.158 0.333 0.181 0.168 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: All Columns are estimated via OLS. TMsBetwen1and2 takes the value of 1 if the firm has been issued 
between one and two TMs before IPO and 0 otherwise.  TMsBetwen3and8 takes the value of 1 if the firm has been 
issued between three and eight TMs before IPO and 0 otherwise. TMsMoreThan8 takes the value of 1 if the firms 
have been issued more than 8 TMs before IPO and 0 otherwise. In all columns, standard errors reported in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. An asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level; two indicate 
significance at the 5% level; three indicate significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 11. Estimation of Cox proportional hazards model of probability of delisting. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
TMGranted -0.692*** -0.697*** -0.698*** -0.804*** -0.802*** -0.835*** 
 (0.0730) (0.0980) (0.112) (0.0796) (0.106) (0.123) 
FirmAge -0.00226* -0.00352* -0.00248 -0.00230 -0.00389* -0.00237 
 (0.00132) (0.00188) (0.00193) (0.00140) (0.00201) (0.00201) 
Proceeds -0.000326** -0.000323* -0.000300 -0.000246 -0.000221 -0.000237 
 (0.000146) (0.000178) (0.000278) (0.000155) (0.000193) (0.000253) 
Earnings -0.113** -0.0359 -0.265*** -0.114* -0.0293 -0.292*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0704) (0.0978) (0.0602) (0.0744) (0.106) 
UnderwriterRank -0.133** -0.196*** -0.0327 -0.159** -0.222*** -0.0449 
 (0.0608) (0.0758) (0.101) (0.0648) (0.0796) (0.110) 
Revisions -0.000712 -0.00256 0.00277 -0.000177 -0.00175 0.00317 
 (0.00214) (0.00280) (0.00343) (0.00234) (0.00302) (0.00379) 
Overhang -0.00360 -0.0109** 0.00876* -0.00125 -0.00817 0.00955* 
 (0.00372) (0.00509) (0.00495) (0.00384) (0.00513) (0.00505) 
Leverage -0.00427 0.0607 -0.00822 -0.00174 0.0708 -0.00625 
 (0.0114) (0.0441) (0.0143) (0.0120) (0.0468) (0.0156) 
Nasdaq 0.192*** 0.287*** 0.00162 0.246*** 0.356*** 0.0297 
 (0.0721) (0.0896) (0.129) (0.0788) (0.0990) (0.136) 
Technology 0.268*** 0.372*** 0.0333 0.259*** 0.399*** -0.0884 
 (0.0832) (0.102) (0.141) (0.0881) (0.107) (0.151) 
Internet 0.0963 0.0681 0.0757 0.166 0.122 0.0645 
 (0.109) (0.114) (0.240) (0.117) (0.121) (0.245) 
       
Observations 2,263 1,405 858 1,666 1,069 597 
Notes: The table illustrates the estimation of Cox proportional hazards model of probability of delisting. Column 1 
considers all firms.  The overall sample is reduced by 12 firms as these firms exited at the year of IPO (t=0). Column 
2 considers all firms in the service sector and Column 3 all firms in the manufacturing sector. To avoid any 
censoring issues in Columns 4-6 we run similar regressions by restricting the sample to firms with IPO year prior to 
2012. IPO year fixed effects are included in all specifications. In all columns, standard errors reported in parentheses 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. An asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level; two indicate significance at 
the 5% level; three indicate significance at the 1% level. 
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Figure 1. Survival function of IPO firms by TM activity. 
 
 
Figure 2. Survival estimates of IPO firms by TM activity. 
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APPENDIX 
Table Α.1. Variable names and definitions. 
Variables Definition 
Dependent Variable:  
Underpricing First day return is the difference between the closing price and offer price divided by 
offer price. Data provided from CRISP. 
Treatment Variables:  
TMGranted Dummy variable set to 1 for firms with at least one Trademark (TM) before the IPO 
procedure, else 0. 
 
TMFiled Dummy variable set to 1 for firms with at least one Trademark (TM) before the IPO 
procedure, else 0. 
 
TMsBetwen1and2 
 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has been issued between one and 
two TMs before IPO and 0 otherwise. 
 
TMsBetwen3and8 Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has been issued between three and 
eight TMs before IPO and 0 otherwise. 
 
TMsMoreThan8 Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firms has been issued more than 8 TMs 
before IPO and 0 otherwise. 
Control Variables:  
FirmAge The number of years from the firm’s initial incorporation to the IPO date. This 
information is acquired from Field-Ritter database. 
 
Overhang The ratio of shares retained by the old shareholders divided by the shares issued. 
 
Proceeds Amount of money equal to the number of shares issued times the offer price. 
 
Revisions Change of the IPO offer price from the midpoint of the initial filing price range. 
 
Earnings Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the year prior to the IPO the firm discloses 
earnings and 0 otherwise. 
 
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities to total assets in the year before the IPO. 
 
UnderwriterRank Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for Underwriters of with rank greater than eight 
as provided   in the Loughran and Ritter (2004) database and 0 otherwise. 
 
Internet Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms that are classified by Thomson 
Financial SDC as operating with internet in their business description. This information 
is drawn via the terms  “Internet”, “Online”, “eBusiness”, “eCommerce”. 
 
Technology Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with SIC codes 3571, 3572, 3575, 
3577, 3578 ,3661, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679 ,3812, 3823, 
3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 ,3841, 3845, 4812, 4813 ,4899, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 
7378 else 0. 
 
Nasdaq Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 to 1 for NASDAQ-listed firms, else 0. 
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Table A.2. Role of TM activity in IPO Underpricing by industry 
 Dependent Variable:   
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
TMGranted 0.067*** 0.013 0.013 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
Service   -0.005 
   (0.010) 
TMGranted_Service   0.055*** 
   (0.020) 
FirmAge 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Proceeds -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet 0.024 0.062** 0.023 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.020) 
Earnings -0.002 -0.011 -0.006 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.009) 
Nasdaq 0.016 0.021 0.018** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.008) 
Technology 0.010 0.026 0.016 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) 
UnderwriterRank 0.043*** 0.017 0.030*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) 
Revisions 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Overhang 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Observations 1,207 861 2,068 
R-squared 0.181 0.178 0.175 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Notes: This Table reports regression results of IPO underpricing. All Columns are estimated via OLS. Columns 1 
considers only firms in the services sectors; Column 2 considers only firms in manufacturing sectors. Column 3 
considers the entire sample and includes an interaction of TMGranted*Service=TMGranted_Service. Service takes 
the value of 1 if the firm belongs in the service sector and 0 otherwise. In all columns, standard errors reported in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. An asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level; two indicate 
significance at the 5% level; three indicate significance at the 1% level. 
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Table A.3. Role of TM activity in IPO underpricing by industry. 
Propensity Score Matching. Expand control sample. 
 Dependent Variable:  
Treatment Variable: TMGranted 
 Exclude Firms in Manufacturing Sectors  
with TMs prior to IPO 
Exclude Firms in Service Sectors 
with TMs prior to IPO 
       
METHOD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Nearest neighbor 0.048*   0.040   
 (0.025)   (0.025)   
Kernel  0.076***   0.013  
  (0.017)   (0.016)  
Stratification   0.076***   0.012 
   (0.021)   (0.015) 
       
Observations 2,015 2,015 2,015 2,002 2,002 2,002 
Notes: Propensity score techniques. In all Columns we select the TMGranted dummy based on the control variables 
of Table 2; that is, FirmAge, Proceeds, Internet, Earnings, Nasdaq, Technology, UnderwriterRank, Revisions, 
Overhang and Leverage. In Columns 1-3, we consider all firms in the service sectors and firms in the manufacturing 
sectors without TMs; in Columns 4-6 we consider all firms in the manufacturing sectors and firms in the service 
sectors without TMs. In Columns 1 and 4 we employ the nearest neighbor method, Columns 2 and 5 the kernel and 
Columns 3 and 6 the stratification method (Zhao 2004). An asterisk indicates significance at the 10% level; two 
indicate significance at the 5% level; three indicate significance at the 1% level. 
